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I

It is hardly  new  to  suggest  that  the existence of  competing  scales  of   hierarchy  and  difference on the Indian subcontinent  have posed a host of  ongoing  political and intellectual  challenges to both  rulers and subjects, particularly,  since the nineteenth century.  The copious  and now-familiar archives of  official, missionary, anti-colonial/ nationalist, reformist/anti-reformist/radical writings across a  range of  discursive grids including policy documents, philology,  ethnography, Indology, political  commentary, journalistic  writing,  speeches,  travel  narrative, memoirs, genealogy  and fiction  bear  ample,  eloquent  testimony  to the challenges within Indian modernity,  of rendering a multifarious social world both  intelligible,  and  simultaneously open to political  negotiation.  

 The available scholarship on  colonial India has thus fruitfully highlighted  the  extent  to  which  the social and political history of  this period needs  to be  indexed as a history of negotiations and  contestations  around the discursive inscription of hierarchy and  difference into the political registers  of  modernity.  Equally we  know well by now  that  such a  seemingly perpetual fluidity between  claimed  markers and  their mobilization to  implicitly press  (or  retard)  competing and  divergent collective claims  has  had important implications for  the possibilities within  Indian modernity. Indeed, the apparently ever-present  fluidity  between  political  inscription  and  the mobilization of collective identities  may  be  explained  as  one of the  defining  features  of  Indian  modernity.

In invoking  this familiar  ground we may signal our point of departure.  Moving  beyond  the  mere  recognition of  some  defining  features  of Indian modernity:  we wish to  to emphasise how the  shaping  of  several key and  intersecting  domains  that emerged in tandem with Indian modernity  remain  as  yet largely  unproblematised.  One  such  key  domain is  the Indian  social science enterprise  as  it  historically emerged  within various  regional contexts  from the last decades  of nineteenth century  onwards.  

This  presentation  thus seeks  to engage with the broad  concerns  of the workshop,  through  an initial exploration of  the  ways  in which  the fluidity between  political inscription and the ever-present pressures to  advance/suppress  collective  claims  have registered upon the  imagination of  the  Indian  social  sciences,  their   disciplinary formation/s  and   the  trajectories  of   particular  disciplines/dominant  sub-fields, post-1947.     

Historically, we know that the Indian social sciences are embedded within the larger vernacular public  domains and the simultaneous  rise of the ‘region’  as  a  political, linguistic  and  cultural formation as these emerged from the early decades of the nineteenth century onwards.  Thus, while the vernacular public sphere predated the rise of the  disciplines, crucially, historically, the legitimacy and distinctiveness of the Indian social science enterprise derived from its partnership with the vernacular  realm.  In other words, the anxious  construction, in the contemporary, of the bhasha (regional language/formerly, the  Indian ‘vernaculars’)   spheres as the realm of  intellectual  subalterneity,  requiring steady  infusions  of translation from the ‘standard’ realm of English, points to a corrosion of the historical nexus between the vernacular/s, the regional and  the critical discourses of  the  Indian social sciences.  

Importantly, this is not simply  a recent view, for  its  genealogy lies in  the fetishistic imaging within colonial ideology of the vernacular realm as  the ‘other’,  dark underside of the disciplinary.   This conservative schema was strongly re-articulated  in the post-Independence  years as the  social sciences showed a  tendency to affiliate and  identify with national paradigms.

In general terms the contemporary  practices  of  the  Indian social  sciences can be said to reflect the  unsettling   fluidity that obtains  (in the Indian context)  between   social status/identities and their  seemingly ‘inherent’ political  possibilities. In order  to establish this,  we offer a  brief  discussion of  the  seemingly paradoxical modes  through  which  the category of ‘region’ becomes indexed, in the critical   decades between 1920 and 1960,  across  the  domains of political/public  debate (on constitutional matters),  official  policy with respect  to  language  and higher education, and the social sciences.

Here it  is useful to reference existing  bodies  of  work on colonial change  in South Asia  that  have shown how  negotiations  and contestations over  the contours of  differentiation, political access, and  dominance occurred variously across  local, regional  and  national arenas. Premised  upon the degree to which different groups could  garner cultural and  political capital  to advance  claims along axes  of influence,  such maneouvres  often presumed  implicit (yet unacknowledged) calibrations in the  location, timing  and  spatial scale of their assertion/s. In other words, the discontinuities  between  elite articulations  across  discursive  domains  cannot be  simply noted in passing;  rather  they need to be  examined as  possibly  strategic sites that require critical interrogation.  

The  apparent  lack of  ‘fit’ between the  salience  differentially accorded  to  the ‘regional’ across discursive  domains  should thus not be regarded as irrelevant or mere  coincidence.  To  anticipate the (larger) argument  somewhat:  the dissimilarities  thrown  up by the juxtaposition of various discourses may serve  as productive contextual markers in the attempt to historicise  disciplinary  trajectories. This applies particularly to the mapping of distinctive thematic preferences, affinities/ruptures or shifts  within  and  across adjacent   disciplinary domains against the social  and  spatial categories  that  are  simultaneously deployed and invoked. 

Constitutional/political debates 1920-1960: difference/hierarchy and   crafting a  federal vision 

A growing body of recent inter-disciplinary  work in  the fields  of  political and  intellectual history for the late colonial period has focused  broadly on the historical construction of the discourses of Indian constitutionalism and  political legitimation in the years  just before and after Independence in 1947.  These works have helped in thematising the genealogies  of  key categories within  contemporary India public and  critical discourses. 

As we know, approximately from 1920 onwards, under Gandhi’s leadership, the nationalist movement moved haltingly but progressively to bolster its claims to authoritatively represent a coalition of political interests and the major constituencies comprising the nation.  Inevitably in a context where the Indian National Congress [INC] was preparing itself to displace colonial sovereignty, key debates around  constitutional questions were as much about attempts to legitimise the terms upon which the INC leadership thought it fruitful and expedient to accommodate major interests and an array of political constituencies. A prime instance of this was the key demand for special electorates from  religious minorities  and lower-caste groups that the Congress  had to negotiate through this phase.  

It is no coincidence that a primary objective both of the Motilal Nehru Report, resulting from the  All-Parties  Conference of  1928, and hailed as  the first blueprint of independent India’s Constitution, as well as of  the Ambedkar-Gandhi Poona Pact of 1932, was to delegitimize the possibility of  separate  electorates for the largest minorities, namely Muslims  and lower-caste  groups, respectively.   

At the same time, the Congress constitution framed under Gandhi’s  guidance in 1920 had divided the party organisational  structure (and by implication the emerging nation)  into 20 provincial units, each identified with a regional  language. The idea of one unit, one language thus aimed to create, within party and nation, a federal scheme comprised of apparently equal constituent units.  Additionally, the move identified language as an ostensibly ‘neutral’ and legitimate marker of cultural distinctness that the nation could profitably embrace, unlike  caste and religious identities​[1]​.  Importantly, notwithstanding Gandhi’s influence,  there was by the late 1930s a growing  acceptance of  planned development as a national goal. 

Against these contexts then, the Constituent Assembly deliberations (between 9th December 1946 and 24th January 1950) further highlighted two important  strands as  key to political negotiations in the decades approximately between 1920 and 1960.  On the one hand, from the late 1920s onwards, for the Congress, debates  around constitutional questions were the space within which to blunt  the demand  for  separate electorates and to lay down the terms upon which  minority interests  and  rights  were to be acknowledged. 

At the same time, discussions of the nature of Indian federalism were progressively mapped onto considerations of the ostensible claims of the bhashas, particularly of  Hindi, to displace English and take on the role of serving as the national, federal and official link language.  This  figuring of the national/federal/official language  question as a direct choice  between the aggressive claims of  Hindi  as the language of the Indian ‘people’ and English’s claims to normative superiority showed the dangerous slippages  at the core of Indian language policy that ceded ground to  a combination of majoritarian, populist and conservative considerations. These processes tragically ensured that any possibilities for the fostering of an integral relation between democracy and language, post-1947, were flatly denied. 
The implicit but unacknowledged weaving together of the minority question with the figuring of language issues within India’s post-colonial nationhood from the 1920 onwards, culminating in the reorganisation of the Indian states as linguistic provinces in the 1950s and 60s,  needs to be unpacked. Importantly, invoking these historical contexts emphasizes the negotiations that too place to arrive at ‘permissible’ trade-offs along the scales of difference and inequality obtaining within Indian democracy. Once coded into constitutional structures and laws, such core assumptions about managing  difference, inequality, patronage and  power across constituencies and federal units  also formed  the implicit and invisible backdrop to the shaping of the official ideology invoking India’s fabled unity  in diversity.
Our account identifies this period as central in defining the maneuvers  that ‘fixed’  the ‘place’  of various  markers such as caste, religion, and language  alongside their  spatial parameters into a grid of legitimate  ‘trade-offs’  that reconciled democratic aspirations with the  interests of regional and national elites to yield an appropriately ‘balanced’ vision of the federal  nation.  The outcomes of these calculations  eventually found normative sanction within the official discourse of citizenship and  minority rights as  enshrined  in the Constitution, even while they continue to anchor notions of the sanctity and ‘inherent’ tolerance of  Indian culture within the  self-image of the post-colonial nation.

Higher  Education Policy 1920 – 1950 : The  Question of  Regional/Additional  Universities​[2]​.   

By highlighting  the conservative tendencies of  Indian language  policy, we can begin  to critically question the populist rhetoric of how the recognition of  the  linguistic regions  as  the  basis  of federal  reorganisation was assumed to offer ‘irrefutable’  proof of  the  essentially democratic credentials of both  the Indian  nation-state and its federal space.  

We  now move  on to briefly  indicate  the  parallel moves through  which the ‘regional’ acquires  comparable  salience  in the ‘neighbouring’ domain of  higher  education policy for the  same period.  Here  too, sadly,  the actual  outcomes  showed  that an apparently  progressive  agenda  that invoked the ‘regional’  as  a site of  necessary  positive investment intended  to enhance  democratic possibilities,  actually generated a conservative agenda  centering around  negotiations between  regional  elites.   

 Significantly,  the  movement  for  the establishment  of additional universities in the  Bombay Presidency started  with the holding of  the  Bombay Presidency  Conference  in 1917, where  a  resolution was  adopted in favour  of  the  establishment  of  separate  universities, one for  each of its four  linguistic  divisions comprising  the predominantly  Kannada, Marathi,  Gujerati  and  Sindhi  areas  respectively.  

Following  this, in 1924, the Government  of  Bombay appointed  an  important  Committee under  Sir  Chimanlal Setalvad  to consider  the  question of  university  reform, including the advisability  and  feasibility of  instituting other  universities  at mofussil   centres.  Scrutinising a  large   volume of  evidence, the  Committee  accepted, in principle,  the need  for   universities  to be  created  for  Maharashtra, Gujarat,  Karnataka and Sind.  

On the face of it, the professed  intentions  seemed  genuinely  progressive, serious  and  benign: 

…we are  impressed  with the need  for  developing  interest  in the  study  of  local   culture,  literature, history and conditions of life and  feel that this  could  be  best  done   by local universities. We  do not think that there  is much danger  of  such  universities becoming  centres  of  disruptive  or centrifugal  forces as  the new  universities   will be  associated  with  wide  areas  such  as  we  propose. ​[3]​ 

However, the  report immediately  went  on to argue  that, presently,  conditions  at  centres  other  than Poona were not yet  ripe  for drawing  up  plans  for  new  universities.  Thus  the Setalvad  committee endorsed  a  recommendation that  only a second University at  Poona should be established. 

The  Committee’s terms  of  reference went on to  show that  one of its  key tasks  was to  review the   existing structure of   the University of Bombay  as  primarily an  affiliating institution and  examining  body.  Instead  it was asked to consider  possible  ways to  remodel its  profile  and  structure  to  become  an  active  teaching university  at the  post-graduate level  with additional  responsibilities  to coordinate  undergraduate  courses and  teaching. Yet at the same time, the  Committee’s  Report rejected petitions from Pune  elites  demanding its  constitutions as  a  residential university, and  internal suggestions  by powerful Marathi  members such as the  eminent  Bombay barrister, M.R. Jayakar,  who wanted to leaving important  decisions - such as  the adoption of  Marathi  as  the language  of  study and  instruction - as  an issue  to be decided  within the new University. 

Instead, although carefully worded,  the Setalvad Committee’s  recommendations  effectively  implied that the  form  of  Poona  University would closely  echo the lines  of  the  existing structure of  the  University of Bombay : 

…if  a university is  to be established  at Poona, it should be an affiliating one,  but  with  substantial teaching  functions, and that all existing  colleges  of  Maharashtra  must be affiliated  with it, while all  High  schools   that desire  to be  recognized for purposes  of   admission  must  seek  approval from Poona  University. But  a  University established  at  Poona  must not have  a preponderance of merely  local  influence  but  must reflect  and represent  the sentiments,  aspirations and opinions of  the whole  of  Maharashtra.​[4]​ 

By  1926,  the  Senate   of  Bombay University  had  passed  a resolution in   confirming the  acceptance of this  recommendation.  And  yet, although the  issue  was  repeatedly  followed  up in  subsequent  years,  both,  at the level of the  University of Bombay and that  of  the  Bombay  government,  it  was  only  in  1948 that a   second  University in the Bombay Presidency was eventually  established.   Importantly, by then, the debate  on the official/national    language   question   precluded  even the very possibility of  choosing Marathi as  the  medium of  instruction in the new regional   University; the only contenders  could  be  Hindi and  English.  Unsurprisingly,  English prevailed  as the  chosen language  through which the all teaching would officially occur  when the new University  began  functioning in February  1948.  

In this analysis, we can see how  the ‘ regional’  was  mobilized  in   positive  if  conservative terms  within constitutional/political  debates  and  the  domains of  language  and  higher-education policy,   as  a  site  of through  which  the  state  could   signal its   progressive  intentions  and credentials. In evident   contrast, the  realm of  Indian  social  science discourse  writing shows  a marked  disinclination overall  to thematise  the ‘ regional’   or  validate the  ‘region’  as useful  descriptive or analytical  category.   While  this  might  seem  least  surprising with  respect  to  the discipline of  economics,  the  reticence of  other   fields such  as   political science  and  sociology in deploying  the category  or  to index  the ‘regional’  as a  significant spatial category  through  which  to analyse  in  writing about  post-Independence  processes  of  social and  political change, is  particularly  remarkable.

Within th  sub-field of  development economics  and  the discourse of economic  planning, the ‘regional’ rarely   figures  as a ‘full’ category.  Rather, the  ‘regional’ is  typically used  to  reference regional disparities  and  imbalances. Paradoxically, the ‘regional’ thus  either appears  as  the site that effectively  demonstrates the success of planning and developmentalism, or  contrarily, as  the site of  recalcitrant and entrenched backwardness that planning must heroically struggle to remove.  Thus the regional  does not figure as  a location whose complexity might invite sustained and nuanced inquiry but is seen instead simply  as  the  incidental consequence  of a staunch belief in the  efficacy of  modernization theory and developmental goals.

That  development economics  should  reference  the  ‘region’  or the  ‘regional’   in such  seemingly  empty  ways   relates of course  to  ways  in which,  in the years  after 1947,  economics   premised  both its  value and prestige  upon its claimed ability  to transcend  nationalist/ culturalist perspectives tied to specific  geographical locations.  Development economists have in particular laid  great  store upon  their special  theoretical toolkit  that allows  them  to work  with ‘hard economic facts’ that are  apparently  impervious to historical  change and  geographical contexts.  Such claims were of course premised on the foundational  belief  that the inter-play of  cultural and political parameters, geographical location and historical change  could be disarmingly disavowed  within the  dominant  sub-field  of    development  economics  and  the  discourse of planning   as  mere ‘externalities’. In other words, the dismal science was allowed through its officially-sanctioned power to re-write the meanings of difference within Indian social and political life in profound ways that have been little recognized and remain to be addressed within the social sciences. 
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^1	  Significantly,  Gandhi’s  simultaneous efforts to involve  himself  with the  Hindi  Sahitya  Sammelan  in order to argue  for  the  unique  efficacy of Hindi   to   be   designated  as  both  official and national language also  date to this  juncture. 
^2	 Although arguments here are based upon the record in the  Bombay Presidency, the analysis would  hold  for  the  thrust of higher education policy pursued for a similar  period in   other  Presidencies  too. 
^3	  Report  of the  Bombay University  Reform Committee  1924, p. 46. 
^4	  Ibid, p. 53.
